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Abstract: Bitcoin has revolutionized the decentralized payment system by excluding the need for a trusted third party,
reducing the transaction (TX) fee and time involved in TX confirmation as compared to a conventional bank-
ing system. The underlying technology of Bitcoin is Blockchain, which was initially designed for financial
TXs only. However, due to its decentralized architecture, fault tolerance and cryptographic security benefits
such as user anonymity, data integrity and authentication, researchers and security analysts around the world
are focusing on the Blockchain to resolve security and privacy issues of IoT. But at the same time, default
limitations of Blockchain, such as latency in transaction confirmation, scalability concerning Blockchain size
and network expansion, lack of IoT-centric transaction validation rules, the absence of IoT-focused consen-
sus protocols and insecure device integration are required to be addressed before it can be used securely and
efficiently in an IoT environment. Therefore, in this paper we analyze some of the existing consensus pro-
tocols used in various Blockchain-based applications, with a focus on investigating significant limitations in
TX (Transaction) validation and consensus mechanism that make them inappropriate to be implemented in
Blockchain-based IoT systems. We also propose a way forward to address these issues.
1 INTRODUCTION
Millions of embedded devices are being used today in
safety and security critical applications such as ICS
(Industrial Control Systems), VANET (Vehicular Ad-
hoc Network), disaster management and critical in-
frastructure (Cam-Winget et al., 2016). A massive
number of these devices have been interconnected to
each other and further connected to the internet to
form an Internet of Things (IoT). It is estimated that
by 2020, the number of IoT connected devices will
exceed to 30 billion (Lund et al., 2014) and M2M
traffic flows are also expected to constitute up to 45%
of the whole internet traffic (Evans, 2011). However,
due to interconnection with the internet, IoT devices
are vulnerable to various security and privacy threats
(Cam-Winget et al., 2016; Poulsen, 2003; Greenberg,
2015; Kumar et al., 2016; Sadeghi et al., 2015; Bor-
gohain et al., 2015).
It is also expected that by the end of 2020, more
than 25% of corporate attacks would be because
of compromised IoT devices (AT&T, 2016). Sim-
ilarly, the successful launch of sophisticated cyber-
attacks like Mirai (Ducklin, 2016), Ransomware
(Brewer, 2016), Xafekopy (Kaspersky-Lab, 2017),
Night Dragon (Miller and Rowe, 2012), Havex
(FSecure-Labs, 2014), and Stuxnet (Langner, 2013)
in recent past have rendered existing IoT protocols in-
effective.
Moreover, despite centralization and controlled
access to data, even the cloud-supported IoT is vul-
nerable to security and privacy issues (Puthal et al.,
2016). Security flaws in IoT are thus leading to at-
tacks on device integrity, data secrecy and privacy, at-
tacks on the availability of network and attacks on the
availability and integrity of services, e.g., DoS and
DDoS Attacks (Borgohain et al., 2015). The current
security issues in IoT can be attributed to centralized
network architecture, lack of application layer secu-
rity, inadequate standardization on IoT products con-
cerning security, i.e., hardware and software, and the
wide gap between manufacturers and security ana-
lysts. According to IBM Institute for Business value
(Brody and Pureswaran, 2014), it is critical for the fu-
ture of IoT that its operational model is revived from
costly, trusted and over-arched centralized architec-
ture to a self-regulating and self-managed decentral-
ized model. Such a transformation will provide scal-
ability, reduced cost of infrastructure, autonomy, se-
cure operations in a trustless environment, user-driven
privacy, access control, data integrity and redundancy
against network attacks.
Although Blockchain-based Bitcoin is a financial
transaction protocol, but due to its decentralized ar-
chitecture and cryptographic security benefits such as
user anonymity, fault tolerance, data integrity and au-
thentication, researchers and security analysts around
the world are focusing on Blockchain to resolve secu-
rity and privacy issues of IoT. No doubt there has been
a surge in the development of new Blockchain plat-
forms including Ethereum, Hyperledger, Multichain,
NEO, and IOTA. However, current Blockchain plat-
forms have some distinct weaknesses that forbid an
impromptu implementation of the Blockchain in an
IoT environment.
The main contribution of this paper is to high-
light peculiar weaknesses in current Blockchain tech-
nologies, which are critical for the design and de-
velopment of a secure Blockchain-based IoT System.
These challenges include lack of IoT-centric transac-
tion validation rules, the absence of IoT-oriented con-
sensus protocol and secure integration of IoT devices
with the Blockchain. To reach the desired conclu-
sions, we have carried out a comprehensive analy-
sis of some of the prominent Blockchain consensus
protocols and have implemented a test scenario of a
Blockchain-supported IoT-based environment moni-
toring system. A prudent solution to these issues
would benefit the entire IoT ecosystem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section-2, we describe the impact of progression in
the Blockchain technology and its impact on IoT.
Challenges to the Blockchain's adoption in IoT are ex-
plained in Section-3. A way forward to solve some of
the challenges is proposed in Section-4, and the paper
is concluded with a hint of future work in Section-5.
2 PROGRESSION OF
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
AND ITS IMPACT ON IOT
Bitcoin-Blockchain has revolutionized the distributed
ledger technology with its significant cryptographic
security and immutability. As a result, a new
Blockchain platform is being introduced every other
day, claiming to be better than the others. IoT being a
Blockchain use case is not astonishing at all. IoT can
leverage the key benefits of Blockchain to resolve its
ever-growing security and privacy issues. Blockchain
with its decentralized architecture and an unforgeable
attribute, provides an ideal solution for IoT systems
that are most of the time deployed in a hostile envi-
ronment without any physical security. IoT systems
can use Blockchain technology as a secure, unforge-
able and auditable log of data. It can also be used
to set policies, control and monitor access rights to
user/sensor data and execute various actions based on
certain conditions using smart contracts.
Due to a large number of Blockchain platforms
currently available, we have carried out a compari-
son of some of the most prominent ones including
Bitcoin, Ethereum, Hyperledger-Fabric and IOTA.
They are compared for the suitability of their func-
tionality and security and performance features con-
cerning IoT environment. As shown in Table-1, the
main security and performance considerations to as-
certain the most suitable Blockchain platform for an
IoT system are as follows; the Blockchain platform
should provide a hybrid network concerning validat-
ing nodes' participation. As some IoT networks such
as smart cities may have a large number of stakehold-
ers willing to contribute to the security of the Public
Blockchain network and on the other side there may
be a private network such as a smart home, where the
owner would be validating the transactions via a cou-
ple of home miners/validators. Currently, Ethereum
(Buterin et al., 2014) and Hyperledger (The-Linux-
Foundation, 2017) provide such a hybrid technol-
ogy. Whereas, Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008) and IOTA
(Popov, 2016) support public participation. It is also
imperative to mention here that as you deviate from
the public Blockchain the more you go away from
the decentralization. Hence, the factor of trust will
come into play, the more private a Blockchain net-
work becomes. IoT systems are deployed for multiple
applications varying from smart watches to ICS, and
again its the Ethereum and Hyperledger that support
multiple Blockchain applications beyond fintech (fi-
nancial technology). An important factor for an IoT
system is the speedy transaction confirmation which
leads to the requirement of instant consensus agree-
ment without Blockchain forks. It is evident from
Table-1 that BFT-based consensus protocols address
this issue with greater reliability. Another vital con-
sideration is that IoT systems especially the sensors
operating in a smart city environment would be gen-
erating millions of transactions per day. Therefore,
an ideal IoT-oriented Blockchain platform should not
have a transaction fee or gas requirement, such as we
have in Ethereum. However, Hyperledger-Fabric has
kept this factor optional.
Modern-day IoT systems not only require M-2-
M payment methods only but also need to share
data, control access rights, set sensor policies and
a lot more. In this regard, IOTA has been de-
signed purely for M-2-M micro or even nano pay-
Table 1: Comparison of Blockchain Platforms.
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ments without any TX fee. However, it does not
support execution of smart contracts, which facili-
tate the user-driven policy setting and access control
rights. The smart contract feature is supported by
Ethereum and Hyperledger-Fabric. IoT systems do
require TX integrity and authentication, which is en-
sured by most of the Blockchain platforms. Out of the
four, only Hyperledger provides data confidentiality
through in-band encryption and ensures the privacy
of user data by allowing the creation of private chan-
nels (Hyperledger-Fabric, 2018). It also supports ID
(Identity) management, anonymity, audit-ability, TX
integrity and authorization through public-key cer-
tificates (from a trusted CA (Certificate Authority)).
Both the factors, i.e., confidentiality and ID manage-
ment, are important requirements from IoT perspec-
tive.
From performance and efficiency point of view
Hyperledger provides a high TX throughput without
any risk of Blockchain forks, thus, minimizing la-
tency in TX confirmation. Hyperledger uses PBFT
(Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance) for validation
of TXs utilizing minimal resources, i.e., low energy
and computation cost (Hyperledger, 2016). Unlike
Ethereum-Blockchain, it does not require any gas to
process the TXs. However, there are some limita-
tions in permissioned Blockchains. Being partially-
decentralized, the trust is placed in some known
miner/validator nodes. Hence, in case of a success-
ful malware attack such as Mirai (Ducklin, 2016)
which can infect and compromise a large number
of nodes for malicious purposes, the integrity of TX
and Block validation process would be questionable.
Moreover, the user enrolment, authentication, and au-
thorization based on public-key certificates is depen-
dent on a trusted CA, which brings some degree of
centralization. Also, most of the private/permissioned
Blockchains incorporate BFT-based consensus algo-
rithms. Such algorithms are prone to DoS attacks.
They can usually tolerate only f = (n− 1)/3 faulty
nodes. BFT-based algorithms such as PBFT are be-
lieved to have high communication complexity, and
they perform very poorly in adverse network con-
ditions. Moreover, BFT-based consensus protocols
have poor scalability, as the TX throughput decreases
badly with an increase in the number of validator
nodes, e.g., if the number of endorser nodes is in-
creased from 1 to 14 in Hyperledger-Fabric, the TX
throughput decreases from 6000 TPS to less than
1500 TPS (Mattias, 2017). With the advancements
in the Blockchain technology and development of
some prominent Blockchain platforms (as shown in
Table-1), there is a hope that some issues concern-
ing IoT security and performance can be easily re-
solved. These issues include security of data in stor-
age, transparency in logging events and transactions,
ability to operate in a trustless environment, fault tol-
erance, data confidentiality, user enrolment, ID man-
agement, audit-ability, key management and access
control. However, there is still a number of perfor-
mance and security challenges in public and permis-
sioned Blockchains that need considerable research.
Therefore, currently it is not possible to just copy and




To identify some real issues concerning
Blockchain's adoption in IoT, we implemented a
test case scenario of an IoT-based supply chain
monitoring system of a frozen food company. The
customer orders frozen food products and also
decides a temperature threshold that has to be
maintained during shipment by the seller. For this
test scenario, we used (Raspberry Pi) Rpi-3 with a
DS18B20 temperature sensor. The sensor monitors
the temperature of the product and periodically sends
the sensor data to a private Ethereum Blockchain
through a smart contract. An alert is generated for the
customer, whenever the temperature threshold policy
is violated during shipment. We would describe every
aspect in chronological order, as labelled from 1 to
14 in Figure-1;
1. As discussed in Section-2, the Blockchain is a dis-
tributed ledger that provides state machine repli-
cation (SMR), ensures data integrity, avoids a sin-
gle point of failure and tolerates faults in a trust-
less environment.
2. In scenario-1, the Rpi-3 with a temperature sensor
can be a full node or a lite Blockchain client. A
full node can validate all TXs but does not mine.
Whereas, a lite client can only keep track of its
TXs. Hence, we can run a Geth (GO Ethereum)
full node in Rpi-3.
3. The temperature sensor senses the environment
and its value is extracted via JavaScript in a Web
UI (User Interface) or a mobile App (Applica-
tion).
4. The Web UI or the Mobile App needs a Web3.js
library to get and push data to the Blockchain.
5. The Web UI connects with the Blockchain Node
running on the Rpi-3 via Web3 provider which
can be an HTTP, WS (web socket) or an IPC
Figure 1: Challenges for a Blockchain-based IoT System.
provider. The Web UI (User Interface) posts the
sensor reading to the Blockchain through smart
contract methods called via the Web3.js library.
Hence, a mobile or a Web App is the interface be-
tween IoT devices and the Blockchain.
6. In scenario-2 an IoT device can be a resource con-
strained Arduino device or other embedded sys-
tems capable of just sensing and transmitting the
temperature sensor readings to a gateway device.
7. The Arduino sensor node communicates with the
gateway device through slower and less secure
wireless communication media such as 802.15.4,
802.11a/b/g/n/p, LoRa, ZigBee, NB-IoT, and Sig-
Fox. Resultantly, IoT systems are prone to data
leakage and other privacy attacks (Jing et al.,
2014).
8. The gateway device is capable of deploying a
Geth full node.
9. It pushes sensor data to the Blockchain through a
Web or a Mobile App and Web3.js library.
10. Just like in scenario-1, the gateway also connects
to the Geth node through a Web3 provider.
11. However, there is a question of how to ensure the
secure input of sensor data to the Blockchain?
12. The intermediary between the sensor node and
the Blockchain is the UI, which cannot lever-
age the cryptographic security provided by the
Blockchain. Instead, additional device, web and
application security measures have to be taken.
13. The point discussed in Ser.12 is also applicable to
the gateway device in scenario-2.
14. Another major weakness observed is that
currently, none of the Blockchain platforms
implements IoT-focused TX validation rules and
IoT-oriented consensus protocol.
The primary challenge is non-availability of IoT cen-
tric consensus protocol. It also has some embedded
issues such as TX/block validation rules, consensus
finality, resistance to DoS attacks, low fault tolerance
and scalability concerning high TX volume, protec-
tion against Sybil Attack, and communication com-
plexity. Another related issue is the secure integration
of IoT devices with the Blockchain. These issues are
being discussed in detail in succeeding paras.
3.1 Lack of IoT-Centric Consensus
Protocol
A detailed comparison of some noteworthy consen-
sus protocols is shown in Figure-2. The points shown
in red color are not suitable for IoT environment,
whereas, points shown in green color are beneficial
for an IoT system. The current consensus protocols
such as PoW (Nakamoto, 2008), PoS (Szabo, 2004),
PoET (Kastelein, 2016), and IOTA (Popov, 2016) are
designed for public blockchains with a focus on finan-
cial value transfer. These consensus protocols share a
common issue that consensus process does not end
in a permanently committed block instead, blocks are
Figure 2: Comparison of Consensus Protocols.
finalized over a period based upon next few blocks
extending the chain and then the longest chain is ac-
cepted as the valid chain. Hence, they are prone to
blockchain forks (EconoTimes, 2017). The lack of
consensus finality results into delayed TX confirma-
tion which is not suitable for most of the real/near
real-time IoT systems requiring instant TX confir-
mation. Moreover, PoET requires special hardware
and the enclave that allocates wait time has to be the
trusted entity. In addition, as IOTA is currently in
open-beta testing phase, it is assumed that some ques-
tions related to its security and performance efficiency
will be answered in due course of time. E.g., Firstly,
will it be an efficient IoT micro-payment system only?
or Will it also support smart contracts like in the
Ethereum and Hyperledger-Fabric blockchains? Sec-
ondly, does it provide confidentiality of data? and
lastly, what is its faulty node tolerance level ?
On the other hand PBFT (Castro and Liskov,
2002; Decker and Wattenhofer, 2013), DBFT (NEO,
2017), HoneyBadger-BFT (Miller et al., 2016) and
Tendermint (Tendermint, 2017) are BFT-based pro-
tocols. BFT is considered to be the desired protocol
for permissioned blockchains in which ID of nodes
is required to be known (Vukolić, 2015), but it also
has certain drawbacks; Except for HoneyBadger-BFT
rest of the BFT-based protocols are prone to DoS at-
tacks due to weak timing assumptions (Miller et al.,
2016). Whereas, the protocols based on timing as-
sumptions are not suitable for unreliable networks,
as liveness property of weakly synchronous protocols
can fail when the weak timing assumptions are vio-
lated due to malicious network adversary capable of
launching DoS attacks (Miller et al., 2016).
The weak synchrony also adversely affects the
throughput of such systems (Miller et al., 2016). An-
other major issue with BFT protocols is scalabil-
ity since they are not usually tested thoroughly be-
yond 20 nodes (Vukolić, 2015). It can be attributed
to the intensive network communication which of-
ten involves as many as O(n2) messages per block
(Castro and Liskov, 2002). The issue of scalability
is there even in the crash-tolerant replication proto-
cols such as Paxos (Lamport, 1998), Zab (Junqueira
et al., 2011) and Raft (Ongaro and Ousterhout, 2014),
which are used in many large-scale systems but prac-
tically never across more than a handful of repli-
cas. Additionally, BFT protocols are only capable
of masking non-deterministic faults occurring on at
the most f = (n− 1)/3 replicas (Castro and Liskov,
2002). Where f is the number of faulty nodes and n is
the number of total nodes. Hence, there is a little ben-
efit in using the BFT library or any other replication
technique when there is a strong positive correlation
between the failure probabilities of the replicas.
As far as TX latency is confirmed, all full and
miner nodes in a blockchain network validate every
TX. The block size and the interval between blocks
impacts the computation power required to validate
all the TXs with minimum latency. Hence, consen-
sus protocols should have high throughput. In this
regard, BFT-based protocols can sustain tens of thou-
sands of TXs with practically network-speed laten-
cies (Bessani et al., 2014). Nakamoto Consensus, i.e.,
PoW is one of the better solutions in a network of
untrusted peers that may not be reliable with Byzan-
tine fault tolerance consensus problems. On the con-
trary, having selected servers or nodes make a deci-
sion is sufficient if all the nodes can be trusted. But it
is a dangerous principle to rely on, even for in-house
“trusted” nodes as they can be compromised. Another
major difference between PoW and BFT-based proto-
cols is the notion of availability, which is a critical
requirement in realtime IoT systems, i.e., PoW being
an incentive-based protocol, does not guarantee that a
pending TX will be included in the next block, as it
is mostly at the discretion of the miners to select TXs
based on their fee. However, this is usually not the
case with BFT-based protocols.
PBFT is considered to be an expensive protocol
concerning message complexity (Luu et al., 2015).
Whereas, bandwidth efficiency and communication-
complexity are also critical requirements, because,
most of the devices in an IoT system use wireless
communication protocols and a typical smart city
IoT network may comprise hundred thousand sensors.
Therefore, any current or future blockchain-based so-
lution must be able to sustain a large number of IoT
devices and comply with the regulations of wireless
communications as per respective country's law. E.g.,
In Europe for LoRaWAN protocol that operates on the
868 MHz frequency band, the allowable duty cycle
is 1% for any user (Adelantado et al., 2016). More-
over, despite reduced communication complexity and
suitability for asynchronous networks, Honeybadger-
BFT is not considered appropriate for IoT systems be-
cause of its cryptocurrency centric approach and low
fault tolerance of f = n/4 faulty nodes only.
To summarize, certain aspects concerning the
blockchain consensus protocols are required to be im-
proved for its application in IoT. These aspects in-
clude IoT centric TX/block validation rules, resis-
tance to DoS attacks (exploiting timing assumptions),
increased fault tolerance (> 1/3 faulty nodes), and
low communication complexity.
3.2 TX Validation
The TX validation process in Bitcoin (Figure-3) val-
idates a TX by checking its format, signatures and
the fact that the input to the TX has not been previ-
ously spent (Buterin et al., 2014; Bitcoin-Developer,
2018). Whereas, Ethereum-Blockchain checks the
format, signatures, nonce, gas, and account balance of
the sender's account (Buterin et al., 2014). Ethereum
TX validation rules are shown in Figure-4. However,
there is a question to the applicability of the same TX
validation mechanism to the IoT systems that usually
comprise heterogeneous devices, thus sending sen-
sory values or data in distinct formats and different
range of values. Also, a targeted or even a generic
malware attack can compromise a lot of IoT devices.
Subsequently, these devices may be turned into bots
and used for further attacks. Therefore, TX validation
rules of cryptocurrency centred Bitcoin protocol and
general purpose Ethereum-Blockchain may not be ap-
propriate for IoT systems.
Figure 3: Bitcoin TX Validation Rules.
Figure 4: Ethereum TX Validation Rules.
3.3 The Requirement of Huge
Resources
According to (Bitcoin.Org, 2017), currently the mini-
mum requirements for a Bitcoin full-node include 177
GB hard disk space, 1 GB RAM, 1 GHz of processing
speed and enough network bandwidth to upload 5 GB
data per day. Although, the 177 GB size of Bitcoin-
Blockchain has reached to its present state over a pe-
riod of nine years, but this aspect has to be kept in
mind while designing a Blockchain-based IoT sys-
tem. IoT systems comprise resource constraint em-
bedded devices. Therefore, it is a challenge to design
a Blockchain-based solution which does not put sub-
stantial memory and processing requirements on IoT
nodes.
3.4 IoT Device Integration
In the experimental scenario shown in Figure-1, the
IoT device pushes sensor data to the Blockchain
through a smart contract called in a Web UI or a
Mobile App or simply by running a JavaScript in
the shell. Currently, Bitcoin-Blockchain and IOTA
do not support execution of smart contracts. Hence,
the only reliable option is Ethereum Blockchain and
Hyperledger-Fabric. Although Ethereum Blockchain
is currently the most tested and a reliable platform for
multiple DApps (Distributed Applications), however,
it has a major limitation, i.e., the smart contracts exe-
cute in EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine) and do not
communicate directly with the outside world. There-
fore, Web3.js library is used as an interface.
In such a situation, the Blockchain is only use-
ful as a secure distributed database once the sensor
data is stored in it. However, before that data in-
tegrity is dependent on the security of the device, Web
UI and Mobile App itself. Keeping in view the cur-
rent threat scenario, where, IoT devices can easily
be hacked, and malicious code can be executed re-
motely, the integrity of IoT devices unless validated
frequently, would always be questionable. Currently,
the only solution available is “Oraclize” (Oraclize,
2018). Which extracts data from various sources in-
cluding web pages, WolframAlpha, IPFS, and any se-
cure application running on Ledger Nano S. To prove
the legitimacy of data, it provides proof of authenti-
cation along with the requested data, i.e., the proof
that data has not been changed and is in its original
form as obtained from the source. However, it does
not cater for the IoT devices.
4 A WAY FORWARD
4.1 IoT-centric Consensus Protocol
Development of an ideal consensus algorithm for an
IoT environment demands that firstly, the require-
ments of a consensus algorithm for a Blockchain-
based IoT system (shown in Figure-5) be distin-
guished from other applications especially, the fin-
tech. The foremost requirement for IoT systems is
IoT-centric TX validation rules. It is important as ev-
ery new TX is independent of the previous TX and an
incident or change in environmental conditions can
influence the change in the sensor readings. Hence,
IoT TX validation rules need to be carefully scripted
and must incorporate environmental context, e.g., in a
smart home, the fireplace is only ignited if another
sensor, e.g., a motion sensor also detects the pres-
ence of a human in that room. The consensus pro-
tocol should be robust against Sybil Attack and must
have consensus finality to avoid forks. It is vital for
the minimum possible delay in TX confirmation and
the ultimate high TX throughput.
A typical IoT system is prone to physical or cyber
Figure 5: Considerations for IoT Consensus Protocol.
attacks. An example of such an attack on IoT devices
in recent past is Mirai Attack in which a large num-
ber of IoT devices including DVR and CCTV cameras
were compromised and turned into bots. These bots
were then used to launch a DDoS attack on a DNS
service provider DYN by directing 620 Gbps data in
the form of millions of DNS lookup requests (Duck-
lin, 2016). Whereas, most of the BFT-based protocols
can tolerate only f = (n− 1)/3 faulty nodes. There-
fore, an IoT-centric consensus protocol must tolerate
maximum possible faulty/dishonest nodes. An impor-
tant consideration to lessen the effect of faulty nodes
is to carry out random integrity check of the valida-
tor/mining nodes so that no dishonest node participate
in the consensus process. Along with security, there
are some performance requirements as well. These
include low computation overhead, low energy con-
sumption and less communication complexity.
4.2 Scalability
It not only affects the Blockchain-size but also in-
directly influences the consensus process. E.g., the
increase in the number of users will also increase
the number of TXs. Hence, if the consensus proto-
col has less throughput then the latency in TX con-
firmation will be increased. To address the issue
of scalability concerning the management of ever-
increasing Blockchain size on light/embedded IoT de-
vices, various Blockchain architectures are being pro-
posed such as sidechains and treechains. An exam-
ple of a sidechain is a decentralized P-2-P network
designed for multi-party privacy-preserving data stor-
age and processing (Zyskind et al., 2015a; Zyskind
et al., 2015b). The proposed model implicitly im-
proves the issue of Blockchain scalability by storing
user data on an off-chain network of private nodes in
the form of DHT. The Blockchain only contains the
pointers/references to data and not all the nodes repli-
cate all TXs.
IBM (IBM-ADEPT, 2015) also addresses the is-
sue of Blockchain size by introducing a concept of
universal and regional Blockchains. It is achieved by
categorizing the network nodes into light peers, stan-
dard peers and peer exchanges depending upon their
processing, storage, networking and power capabil-
ities. The light peers consist of embedded devices,
such as Arduino and Raspberry Pi based sensor nodes,
These nodes only store own Blockchain address and
balance. They rely on other trusted peers to obtain
TXs relevant to them. Whereas, the standard peers
have more processing power and storage capacity
than the light peers. They can store some of the recent
TXs of their own and the light peers in their neigh-
bourhood. Finally, the peer exchanges have high stor-
age and computing capabilities, and they can replicate
complete Blockchain data with an additional feature
of data analytic services. In addition, as per NIST
(Konstantinos et al., 2016), resource-constrained de-
vices may maintain a compressed ledger containing
only their TXs.
In another development, to address Bitcoin-
Blockchain's problems of scalability, high TX fee
and requirement of substantial hardware resources, a
blockless architecture named “IOTA” have been in-
troduced (IOTA, 2017). Instead of a conventional
Blockchain, IOTA is a distributed architecture based
on DAG called Tangle (Popov, 2016). It aims to pro-
mote machine economy, in which smart devices can
interact with each other by making smallest possible,
nano-payments. To ensure fast TXs, IOTA does not
require TX fee. Moreover, the consensus (TX vali-
dation) and normal TX process are also inter-knitted,
i.e., before making a new TX each user randomly ap-
proves/validates previous two TXs. IOTA achieves
high throughput by parallelizing the TX validation
process. Hence, an increase in the number of new
TXs on the Tangle is inversely proportional to the
TX settlement time (IOTA-Support, 2017). There-
fore, an expanding network contributes well to the
overall security and fast TX settlement. The two TXs
to be approved by every new TX are randomly se-
lected based on MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo)
method. A TX getting more and more direct/indirect
approvals is considered to be more accepted by the
network. Hence, it would be difficult for anyone to
double-spend that particular TX. The difference be-
tween IOTA and a typical Blockchain architecture is
shown in Figure-6 (IOTA-Support, 2017).
Another solution proposed for the scalability of
Ethereum-Blockchain is called “Plasma” (Poon and
Buterin, 2017). It uses a series of smart contracts
to create hierarchical trees of sidechains, which can
be thought of as “subchains”. The subchains live
within a parent-Blockchain and periodically commu-
nicate with the root-chain (Ethereum). The subchains
are off-line, hence, theoretically there can be as many
subchains as desired (REX-Blog, 2017).
4.3 Improving Upon TX Confirmation
Time
TX confirmation time can also be associated with the
problem of Blockchain scalability. In current public
Blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, the miner
nodes store the complete Blockchain and validate ev-
ery TX in an order. It does improve security but also
creates a bottleneck in case of high TX volume. As
the Blockchain cannot process more transactions than
a single node can. One of the methods being re-
searched to reduce TX confirmation time is “Shard-
ing” (James, 2018b). It means a subset of miner nodes
process a subset of TXs (as shown in Figure-7). The
subset of miner nodes should be populated in a way
that the system is still secure and at the same time
several TXs can be processed simultaneously (James,
2018b; REX-Blog, 2017). In its purest form, each
shard has its own transaction history and it is effected
only by the TXs it contains. E.g., say in a multi-asset
Blockchain, there are n shards and each shard is as-
sociated with one particular asset. In more advanced
forms of sharding, TXs on one shard can also trigger
events on some other shard. This is usually termed as
cross-shard communication. However, currently be-
ing in a novice state, there are numerous challenges
that should be resolved before sharding is adopted
publicly. Some of these challenges include; cross-
shard communication, fraud detection, single-shard
manipulation, and data availability attacks (James,
2018b).
Another approach to reducing TX processing time
is “Raiden”. It proposes the use of state channel tech-
nology to scale the Ethereum network off-chain and
to facilitate micro-TXs between IoT devices(REX-
Blog, 2017). The off-chain TXs will allow a set of
nodes to establish payment channels between each
Figure 6: IOTA vs Blockchain
Figure 7: Sharding.
other, without directly transacting with the Ethereum-
Blockchain. Hence, Off-chain TXs would be faster
and cheaper than on-chain TXs because they can be
recorded immediately, and there is no need to wait
for block confirmations. However, it is believed that
Channel-based strategies can scale transaction capac-
ity only but cannot scale state-storage. Moreover, they
are vulnerable to DoS attacks (James, 2018b).
4.4 IoT Device Integration
In addition to Web and Mobile App security, device
security can be augmented to ensure the integrity of
sensor data, to be pushed to the Blockchain. The
first in device security measures is device enrolment,
in which only approved devices be allowed to com-
municate with the Blockchain and call smart contract
methods. Smart contracts can restrict calling of var-
ious methods to a specific node only. Secondly, all
the unnecessary ports on the device should be blocked
such as JTAG and UART. Since any open port can be
used by an adversary to access the device and make
malicious changes. Thirdly, most of the commercially
available IoT devices such as sensing devices do not
have secure execution environment to keep the cost
low. Therefore, the device integrity check should fre-
quently be performed to ensure its legitimacy.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Blockchain has revolutionized the technological
world with its distributed network architecture, de-
centralized control and ability to sustain autonomous,
self-regulating, self-managed and fault tolerant IoT
systems. However, still there exist some open re-
search challenges that need to be resolved to lever-
age Blockchain's benefits at the optimum. These
challenges include, IoT-centric TX and block val-
idation rules, IoT-oriented consensus protocol, fast
TX confirmation for real-time IoT systems, scalabil-
ity, and secure device integration to the Blockchain.
In future, we plan to develop a secure IoT-focused
Blockchain consensus protocol with some embedded
features such as device integrity check, maximum
faulty nodes tolerance level and IoT-oriented TX val-
idation rules. A judicious research in this regard will
benefit entire IoT ecosystem.
REFERENCES
Adelantado, F., Vilajosana, X., Tuset-Peiro, P., Martinez,
B., and Melia, J. (2016). Understanding the limits of
lorawan. arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.08011.
AT&T (2016). The CEO’s Guide to Data Secu-
rity. Protect your data through innovation -
AT&T Cybersecurity Insights (Vol 5). Avail-
able at https://www.business.att.com/
cybersecurity/docs/vol5-datasecurity.pdf,
Viewed 8 January 2018.
Bessani, A., Sousa, J., and Alchieri, E. E. (2014). State
machine replication for the masses with bft-smart.
In 44th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference
on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), pages
355–362. IEEE.
Bitcoin-Developer (2017). Bitcoin developer guide. Avail-
able at https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-
guide\#block-chain, Viewed 17 December 2017.
Bitcoin-Developer (2018). Transactions. Available
at https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-guide#
transactions, Viewed 17 March 2018.
Bitcoin-Org (2017). Warning: Better security has costs.
Available at https://bitcoin.org/en/bitcoin-
core/features/requirements, Viewed 28 Decem-
ber 2017.
Bitcoin.Org (2017). System reqirements. Avail-
able at https://bitcoin.org/en/bitcoin-core/
features/requirements, Viewed 17 December
2017.
Borgohain, T., Kumar, U., and Sanyal, S. (2015). Survey of
security and privacy issues of internet of things. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1501.02211.
Brewer, R. (2016). Ransomware attacks: detection, preven-
tion and cure. Network Security, (9):5–9.
Brody, P. and Pureswaran, V. (2014). Device democracy:




Buterin, V. et al. (2014). A next-generation smart contract
and decentralized application platform. Whitepaper.
Cachin, C. (2016). Architecture of the hyperledger
blockchain fabric. In Workshop on Distributed Cryp-
tocurrencies and Consensus Ledgers.
Cam-Winget, N., Sadeghi, A. R., and Jin, Y. (2016). Can
IoT be secured: Emerging challenges in connect-
ing the unconnected. In Design Automation Confer-
ence (DAC), 2016 53nd ACM/EDAC/IEEE, pages 1–6.
IEEE.
Castro, M. and Liskov, B. (2002). Practical byzantine fault
tolerance and proactive recovery. ACM Transactions
on Computer Systems (TOCS), 20(4):398–461.
Decker, C. and Wattenhofer, R. (2013). Information prop-
agation in the bitcoin network. In Thirteenth Interna-
tional Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P),
pages 1–10. IEEE.
Ducklin, P. (2016). Mirai “Internet of Things” malware
from krebs ddos attack goes open source. Naked
Security. Available at https://nakedsecurity.
sophos.com/2016/10/05/mirai/, Viewed 12
February 2018.
EconoTimes (2017). Blockchain project antshares explains




Viewed 18 December 2017.
Etherscan (2018). Ethereum transaction chart 2018. Avail-
able at https://etherscan.io/chart/tx, Viewed
5 February 2018.
Evans, D. (2011). The Internet of Things: How the
next evolution of the internet is changing everything.
CISCO Whitepaper, 1(2011):1–11.
FSecure-Labs (2014). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Sys-
tems. Available at https://www.f-secure.com/
weblog/archives/00002718.html, Viewed 9 De-
cember 2017.
Greenberg, A. (2015). Hackers remotely kill a jeep on the
highway—with me in it. Wired, 7:21.




Hyperledger-Docs (2018). Introduction to hyperledger fab-
ric. Available at https://hyperledger-fabric.
readthedocs.io/en/latest/blockchain.html,
Viewed 13 February 2018.
Hyperledger-Fabric (2018). Hyperledger-fabric
documentation. Available at https:
//media.readthedocs.org/pdf/hyperledger-
fabric/latest/hyperledger-fabric.pdf,
Viewed 18 February 2018.
Hyperledger-Gas (2016). Gas with hyperledger fab-
ric? Available at https://stackoverflow.com/
questions/38635778/gas-with-hyperledger-
fabric, Viewed 15 February 2018.
IBM-ADEPT (2015). An internet of things practi-
tioner perspective. Technical report, IBM. Avail-
able at https://archive.org/details/pdfy-
esMcC00dKmdo53-_, Viewed 21 March 2018.
IOTA (2017). What is iota? Available at https://iota.
readme.io/v1.2.0/docs, Viewed 24 March 2018.
IOTA-Support (2017). An introduction to iota. Available
at http://www.iotasupport.com/whatisiota.
shtml, Viewed 27 March 2018.
James, R. (2018a). Ethereum/wiki - mining. Available
at https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/
Mining, Viewed 5 February 2018.
James, R. (2018b). On sharding blockchains. Available
at https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/
Sharding-FAQs, Viewed 27 April 2018.
Jing, Q., Vasilakos, A. V., Wan, J., Lu, J., and Qiu, D.
(2014). Security of the internet of things: perspectives
and challenges. Wireless Networks, 20(8):2481–2501.
Junqueira, F. P., Reed, B. C., and Serafini, M. (2011).
Zab: High-performance broadcast for primary-backup
systems. In 41st International Conference on De-
pendable Systems & Networks (DSN), pages 245–256.
IEEE.
Kaspersky-Lab (2017). Trojans exploit WAP sub-
scriptions to steal money 2017. Available
at https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/wap-
billing-trojans/18080/, Viewed 15 February
2018.
Kastelein, R. (2016). Intel jumps into blockchain
technology storm with ‘sawtooth lake’ distributed
ledger. Available at http://www.the-blockchain.
com/2016/04/09/, Viewed 21 March 2018.
Konstantinos, K., Angelos, S., Irena, B., Jeff, V., and
Grance, T. (2016). Leveraging blockchain-based pro-
tocols in iot systems. NIST-Computer Security Re-
source Center.
Kumar, S. A., Vealey, T., and Srivastava, H. (2016). Secu-
rity in internet of things: Challenges, solutions and fu-
ture directions. In 49th Hawaii International Confer-
ence on System Sciences (HICSS), pages 5772–5781.
IEEE.
Lamport, L. (1998). The part-time parliament. ACM Trans.
Comput. Syst., 16(2):133–169.
Langner, R. (2013). To kill a centrifuge: A technical analy-
sis of what stuxnet’s creators tried to achieve. Avail-
able at https://www.langner.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf,
Viewed 11 December 2017.
Lund, D., MacGillivray, C., Turner, V., and Morales, M.
(2014). Worldwide and regional Internet of Things
(IoT) 2014–2020 forecast: A virtuous circle of proven
value and demand. International Data Corporation
(IDC), Tech. Rep.
Luu, L., Narayanan, V., Baweja, K., Zheng, C.,
Gilbert, S., and Saxena, P. (2015). Scp: A
computationally-scalable byzantine consensus proto-
col for blockchains. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
2015:1168.
Mattias, S. (2017). Performance and scalability of
blockchain networks and smart contracts. Master’s
thesis, Umea University, Sweden.
Miller, A., Xia, Y., Croman, K., Shi, E., and Song, D.
(2016). The honey badger of bft protocols. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages 31–
42. ACM.
Miller, B. and Rowe, D. (2012). A survey SCADA of
and critical infrastructure incidents. In Proceedings of
the 1st Annual conference on Research in information
technology, pages 51–56. ACM.
Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic
cash system.
NEO (2017). Whitepaper. Available at http://docs.neo.
org/en-us/, Viewed 18 December 2017.
Ongaro, D. and Ousterhout, J. K. (2014). In search of an un-
derstandable consensus algorithm. In USENIX Annual
Technical Conference, pages 305–319.
Oraclize (2018). How it works. Available at http://www.
oraclize.it/, Viewed 6 May 2018.
Poon, J. and Buterin, V. (2017). Plasma: Scalable au-
tonomous smart contracts. Whitepaper.
Popov, S. (2016). The tangle. Whitepaper. Avail-
able at http://iotatoken.com/IOTAWhitepaper.
pdf, Viewed 26 March 2018.
Poulsen, K. (2003). Slammer worm crashed ohio nuke plant
net. The Register, 20.
Puthal, D., Nepal, S., Ranjan, R., and Chen, J. (2016).
Threats to networking cloud and edge datacenters
in the internet of things. IEEE Cloud Computing,
3(3):64–71.
REX-Blog (2017). Sharding, raiden, plasma: The scaling





Sadeghi, A. R., Wachsmann, C., and Waidner, M. (2015).
Security and privacy challenges in industrial Internet
of Things. In Design Automation Conference (DAC),
2015 52nd ACM/EDAC/IEEE, pages 1–6. IEEE.
Szabo, N. (2004). The idea of smart contracts. IEEE Inter-
national Workshop on Electronic Contracting (WEC).
Tendermint (2017). Byzantine consensus algorithm.
Available at https://tendermint.readthedocs.
io/en/master/specification/byzantine-
consensus-algorithm.html, Viewed 15 February
2018.
The-Linux-Foundation (2017). Hyperledger business
blockchain technologies. Available at https://www.
hyperledger.org/projects, Viewed 19 February
2018.
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